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Terrorism in the Middle East has plagued the United States for over a decade and groups, like ISIS, show
that terrorism can be well organized and financed. From a homemade bomb to a small army, each act of
terrorism requires funding to turn hateful speech into an action. In the Middle East, funding for terrorism
falls into three major categories: criminal, legal, and charity from like-minded individuals. Despite public
disdain for global terror there are still some individuals, both foreign and domestic, who seek to fund
terrorist attacks. Finding the sources of this funding is essential in order to stem terrorism, but doing so is
not always easy. Those who fund terror do so through many mediums such as: black markets, offshore
accounts, phony companies, and illegal shipments; which can make it very hard to track. By looking at past
investigations on terrorism in the Middle East to see what patterns emerge, investigators can be pointed
towards places where they can most effectively use their resources to stop future terrorist funding.
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1. Introduction:
Terrorism in the Middle East is a significant issue that has pulled the whole world into a war, not of nation
against nation, but of small battles across the globe; fought by individuals and financed by a vast network
of crime. The three major sources of funding for terror groups come from: criminal activity, legitimate
business, and donations. Each of these categories present unique challenges because they utilize different
techniques and methods. Understanding how each method works is the first step in developing a plan to
counteract, or prevent, terrorism.

2. Crime:
The proceeds of criminal activity make up a large amount of funds that end up supporting terrorism1. While
some may look at terrorist organizations as similar in nature to the American Mafia, Italian Mafia or other
ethnically based criminal organizations, it is important to notice the differences between a mafia style
organization and a terrorist organization. Mafia style organizations are crime centered, they earn money
and maintain power through a carefully laid out and maintained criminal network. This network includes
all kinds of crimes from petty theft to grand larceny. Terrorist organizations, on the other hand, are not
usually organized to make money but to win a political debate through the use of force, fear, and the
infliction of damage to political or social order. In addition, terror groups often have donors who provide
significant funding and support the political, social, or religious goals of the terrorists. Therefore, because
the proceeds of criminal activity can be thought of as serving as a form of supplemental income for terrorist
organizations, an exclusive or primary focus on criminal conduct may not be successful. Some

commentators believe that the terrorist group ISIS (ISIL) is a notable exception to this rule, as their size and
need for increasing amounts of money has driven them to rely on a great deal of criminal activity such as
drug trafficking, smuggling, and to a lesser degree counterfeiting to meet their need for terrorist financing2.

2.1 Drug Trade:
The drug trade, especially from Afghanistan, provides Middle Eastern terror groups with significant
amounts of money each year3. For many groups, including the Taliban, drugs offer a very attractive
solution for money as they do not need to actually invest manpower in farming the crops; instead they
either own opium farms or co-opt locals who already farm the land. Afghanistan is the world’s largest
supplier of opium, producing an estimated 380 tons each year4. To put this number into perspective, the
United Nations estimates total global amounts of heroin on the market or seized at around 440 tons, and the
annual global consumption as only 340 tons5. Afghanistan’s production can supply most of the world’s
demand for heroin. This large and global business creates several billion dollars worth of revenue each
year, with much of it going to support Islamic terrorist organizations. The fact that the majority of opium
fields in Afghanistan are controlled directly by insurgents, ensures that a larger share of any money earned
will go directly back to their parent terrorist organizations6. As with all traffic in contraband, ownership of
distribution and trafficking routes is also very valuable. In this way, though ISIS does not actually grow any
opium it earns a great amount of revenue from drug trafficking. Through its control of land ISIS gets
money from international drug traffickers by allowing their drug smugglers safe passage through their
lands for money7. The approach taken by ISIS demonstrates the value to terrorists of controlling trade
routes and transportation capabilities and underscores the sophistication of ISIS among other terrorist
organizations.

2.2 Cigarettes and Baby Formula:
The sale of smuggled goods, both expected and unexpected provide funding for terror. Most people are not
likely to be surprised that the smuggling of items, such as cigarettes provides fairly steady income for the
terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda and HAMAS. Such smuggling is not limited to
activities in foreign countries. Unbeknownst to the general public, Hezbollah has a significant domestic
presence in the United States. The group is present here in the form of various terror cells that are used for
fundraising and even recruitment8. A fairly large cell was recently discovered and suppressed in North
Carolina9. Information gathered by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
indicated that the aforementioned terrorist groups had run a sophisticated cigarette smuggling operation
between North Carolina and Michigan. The terrorist groups exploited the fact that these two states have
different taxes on the purchase of cigarettes. The terrorists would buy the cigarettes in North Carolina, with
a tax of 5 cents, and sell them in Michigan, where taxes ran to 75 cents, keeping the difference10.
Smuggled cigarettes were by no means the only way domestic terrorist cells raised funds. In the late
1990’s local and federal authorities broke up several baby formula shoplifting rings in Texas. These rings
were organized so that individuals, called boosters, were paid one dollar per bottle of baby formula stolen.
These bottles were then stripped of their store tags and repackaged; through phony companies they were
then resold to retailers at cost. These rings were so large and so successful that the largest one netted an
estimated $44 million in only 18 months11.

3. ISIS Anomaly:
Crime as a method of supplementing donor money has previously been discussed, but there is one
significant deviant from the usual terrorist finance model. What sets ISIS apart is not the use of smuggling,
as other groups also use it to varying degrees, what is unique is their predominant reliance on crime to fund
terrorist operations. In contrast to the majority of terrorist groups that use crime to supplement the money
they receive from donations, ISIS takes the opposite approach-- relying on crime to fund its operations. In
doing so ISIS acts with the sophistication and intensity associated more with the mafia than a small or
common terrorist organization. ISIS has exploded onto the global scene, seemingly from nowhere. After
further observation, however, we see that it was merely hiding in the shadows before choosing to step into

the light. Mosul is where ISIS first reared its head and now serves as a nerve center of sorts for the
organization12. The city of Mosul is comparable to the city of Chicago, Illinois, during the 1920’s. Like
Chicago, where the city government ostensibly ran the city, the real power lay with criminals. As Al
Capone and his Italian mafia ruled Chicago, so ISIS rules Mosul13.
Compared to many terrorist organizations, ISIS is highly organized. Their relative sophistication helps to
explain their rapid expansion in the area, into an interwoven system of terrorist cells. Each cell is
independent, in that it plans its own terrorist acts, however, the finances are what tie the cell to the leaders
of ISIS. After a cell plans their attack they raise their own money to finance the planned act. If they can’t
self-fund through crime and the act is deemed necessary, they have the option of receiving aid from ISIS
leaders, who control a pool of money that has been accumulated through a tribute system. As long as a cell
is operational it pays a portion of its total funds to ISIS leaders who then can distribute it to cells who are
struggling or help fund a particularly large attack14. Each cell earns money through a variety of crimes such
as: extortion, theft, and smuggling fees. Whereas donations usually make up a large portion of terrorist
funds, it is estimated that ISIS receives no more than 5% of its income from donations15. Those donations
that it does receive come largely from the Arab Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar16.

4. Donations:
4.1 Pakistan:
As stated previously, donor support makes up a large portion of terrorist funds; in fact, there are several
terrorist organizations that were created by sovereign states and are arguably sustained by them. The
benefits are clear, as outlaws, terrorist organizations attract the attention and blame for their direct actions
whereas the nation-states behind them maintain a degree of deniability. One example of state-sponsored
terror is Pakistan. The Pakistani nation is not very large geographically. Pakistan is also surrounded by
countries with which it has fought or believes them to represent threats to their sovereignty. As a result,
Pakistan has sought a means of control and security over its neighbors. In response to the Soviet threat in
the Middle East during the Cold War, the Pakistani government actually created several terrorist
organizations that reported directly to the secretive Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). This is
the Pakistani equivalent of the CIA. These organizations, such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, exist for
specific purposes, including retaining regional influence17.
State sponsored terror groups pose challenges for the nation-states that create them since they cannot be
sure whether the terrorists will remain faithful to their creator or be willing to continue to do their bidding.
Pakistan’s intelligence organization is a glaring example, having lost control of several of these groups,
which now act independently of Pakistan and pose a threat to United States interests and their own region18.
Despite losing control of several terrorist organizations Pakistan has continued its involvement with terror
groups. For example, Pakistan may have gained control, or influence in, Al-Qaeda19. In an interesting turn
of events, the Pakistani government supported the United States in pursuing and dealing a massive blow to
Al-Qaeda, and yet there is speculation that Pakistan may in fact now be a significant influencer on AlQaeda operations. As Dr. Catino, a counterinsurgency adviser who has served with the US Army during the
War on Terror, explains it, the Pakistani army did deal significant damage to local Al-Qaeda operatives but
left the leadership untouched20. It seems as if they had the ability to finish off key leaders and yet chose to
leave them alive. This, coupled with the country’s history in maintaining relationships with terrorist
organizations, makes them suspect of being in a position of power within Al-Qaeda.

4.2 Saudi Arabia:
To date, the United States has not declared Saudi Arabia to be a state sponsor of terror. Instead, the United
States continues to treat Saudi Arabia as an ally. The fact that Saudi Arabia is not an official state sponsor,
however, should not be confused as equivalent to having clean hands. Since 9/11, Saudi Arabia has been
criticized for its lack of action to police its citizens and stop support for terrorist supporting organizations.
Recently, a leaked message from Hillary Clinton, during her time as Secretary of State, to Saudi royalty
detailed requests that they (Saudi Arabia) take seriously the fact that their citizens were actively sending
donations to terrorist organizations21. This email highlights how countries that want the benefits of

relationships with terrorists can officially denounce terrorism while creating an environment for them to
prosper by turning a blind eye to their conduct within their own borders.
The Saudi government, however, goes much farther in supporting terrorists. For example, Saudi Arabia
has provided material support for Al-Qaeda in the Bosnian War as well as monetary support to the terrorists
who brought down the Twin Towers. During the Bosnian War Al-Qaeda sent fighters to become
mujahedeen and fight with the Bosnian Muslims against the Bosnian Serbs. Testimony from an Al-Qaeda
defector, Ali Ahmad Ali Hamad, provides direct evidence that Al-Qaeda intended to set up long-term bases
in Bosnia for future operations, as well as, evidence of material support from the Saudi government22.
Hamad provided testimony that Saudi officials, specifically from the Saudi High Commission for Relief in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, gave material assistance to Al-Qaeda fighters and provided him access to
diplomatic cars, allowing him uninhibited travel throughout Bosnia23. After the war the Commission
provided Hamad and several other mujahedeen employment at the Saudi High Commission, while being
aware that Hamad was acting under the direction of Al-Qaeda24. This type of blatant support from several
countries presents a very clear threat to any positive action that a government or entity tries to take to stem
the flow of money to terrorist organizations.

5. Legitimate Business:
While individual countries providing support to terrorist organizations certainly is a grave international
threat, it is perhaps more disturbing domestically, that there are entities masquerading as charities that are
supporters of international terrorism. There are several charities that operate within the United States that
profess to take money in support of humanitarian aid in the Middle East, however, a closer examination
reveals that many take the money and give it to terrorist organizations. For the individual trying to support
true humanitarian efforts in the Middle East, determining which charities are fronts for terrorism is very
difficult. In fact, the United States government has failed to make public a list of appropriate charities to
Muslim groups who wish to truly invest in charity. The driving force behind misappropriation of charities
stems from the teachings of Islam that require a zakat, or mandatory tithe. Unlike Christian tithes, which
are not enforced by the state, Muslim countries enforce the giving of money to the state for redistribution;
Muslims abroad are expected to give to charities that will invest back in the Middle East25. The Saudi
government is a prime example of how such charitable requirements can be abused. As many Muslim
countries do, the Saudi’s collect taxes from citizens to be used exclusively in fulfillment of zakat. The
distribution of the money, however, is entirely up to the State. Since the State’s official religion is
Wahhabism, a sect of Islam that is viewed as supporting extremism and an ultra-orthodox view of Islam,
Saudi Arabia can support the families, activities, and provide the other necessities of Saudi Muslims who
support terror without violating their religion26. Moreover, they can argue that their religion compels them
to do so. The charities that many international Muslims donate to are also suspect. Several, such as the:
Global Relief Foundation; Holy Land Foundation; and Third World Relief Agency, take donations and give
them to terrorist organizations27,28. The mixing of legitimate charity organizations with members of the
same that contribute to terrorism makes the question of determining what charity donations fall into the
category of legitimate a daunting challenge. The examples given above are not the only examples of where
this happens. The reality, however, is that on the surface their criminality was by no means, immediately
obvious to investigators or the government of the United States. The investigations required painstakingly
difficult work to piercing the corporate veil and see what was really happening to the money being raised.
Finally, even where the source of the funding is discovered to be suspect, separating legitimate charities
from those that are terrorist affiliated is very difficult given the opaque nature of the industry that allows for
a great level of anonymity in distributing the funds they manage.

6. Hawala:
Financial Crime typically involves a high degree of secrecy to prevent a country’s tax or justice authorities
from tracking the movement of money and its owners. While financial crimes are perceived as being
complex white-collar activities, moving money efficiently without leaving a trail has a long history.
Moving money within countries and across borders to different cells of a terrorist organization or inbetween individuals often involves wire transfers and banking systems where privacy is sacrosanct. What
many do not know is that there exists a global money transfer system that does not use traditional banks

and has not paper trail. This informal system is called hawala. Hawala is the term used to refer to the
massive, worldwide network of informal bankers who move money around for various reasons. It is
important to note that there are many legitimate uses for hawala, chiefly for sending remittance money
home for many foreign workers in the United States. One of the biggest users of this technique involves the
large Somali population in Minnesota. As they earn money in the United States, they want to send it home,
however, due to the lack of any trustworthy financial institutions in Somalia they have to rely on informal
hawala bankers29. That said, there are also many less noble uses for the system, as it is just that, a system
and is only as good as those who use it. The system works without any laws or regulations, only the
“honor” of each individual. That honor is really dependent on the trust of each individual banker, or
hawaladar, to repay debts to each other. A simplified view of how an individual transaction occurs is
pictured (Figure 1) below.

Figure 1: Hawala transaction system
Figure 1 Retrieved from GAO November 2003 report on terrorist financing
When one person wants to send money abroad they contact the individual they wish to send money to,
figure out how much and set a passcode to be used later for retrieving the funds. Then, Person A meets with
a hawaladar who will record how much money is to be sent. The hawladar with the funds will contact a
hawaladar that is located near the intended recipient of the funds. The second hawaladar will pay out the
money to whoever gives him the correct passcode. There is no wiring of funds from one hawaladar to
another, instead the hawaladars pay out of their pocket. In order to settle debts and ensure that no one loses
money, debts are settled through the exchange of goods, services, or cancellation of prior debts30.

7. Conclusion:
The problem of terrorist financing is a problem that is immediate and dangerous to the American people
and yet it presents itself not just within the jurisdictional boundaries of the United States. Instead, the

problem is multinational and crosses borders without distinction. The proceeds of criminal activity,
charitable donations, and seemingly legitimate business are three major avenues used to fund terrorism.
Due to the fact that criminal activity takes so many forms and the use of new technologies and ancient
methods of moving money make any one way of combatting this problem futile, investigative efforts must
keep up with new techniques and tools used by terrorists. While the horrific crime and act of war engaged
in on 9/11 brought great attention to Al Qaeda, it is perhaps what ISIS is doing that should concern
governments. As discussed above, ISIS has mastered methods of benefiting from criminal activity, even
when it does not directly perpetrate the crime. Moreover, it is now an example for why terrorists must
control territory, especially where it can extort money from criminals that must cross territory they control.
An in depth study of this group in particular could yield interesting and effective methods for combating
future terrorist organizations who seek to model themselves after ISIS because of their success. For the
time being, however, it appears that donations are the backbone of terrorism financing and mainly come in
the form of government aid from sympathizing countries or large monetary donations by wealthy
individuals. In both cases a bulk of donations come from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and other Arab Nations
and their involvement is well known. The question then, is whether there is a will to disturb an otherwise
positive diplomatic relationship or not. The guise of legitimate business to bankroll terrorism, whether a
nonprofit corporation or charity or for-profit business, poses challenges for law enforcement and regulators
who face limited budgets and the need to address serious and violent crime. Is the answer more regulation
and would that approach hurt legitimate efforts to help desperate people in terrible circumstances?
What is known is that terrorism is on the rise and with it, the demand for ever greater funding. Arguably,
the solution will require at least this—that governments continue to shine a light on those of means,
whether or not in government, who are actively involved in sponsoring terrorism or simply turning a blind
eye toward the activity. Those who have both a public image to uphold and by virtue of the image are also
likely to be powerful people, may yet, because of fear of exposure be convinced that it is in no one’s
interest, especially theirs, to allow terror to prosper.
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